Abstract-In this paper, we investigate a class of distortion outage minimization problems for a wireless sensor network in the presence of an eavesdropper. The observation signals transmitted from the sensors to the fusion center (FC) are overheard by the eavesdropper. Both the FC and the eavesdropper reconstruct minimum mean squared error estimates of the physical quantity observed. We address the problem of transmit power allocation to minimize the distortion outage at the FC, subject to an expected total transmit power constraint across the sensor(s) and a secrecy outage constraint at the eavesdropper. Applying a rigorous probabilistic power allocation technique, we derive power policies for the full channel state information (CSI) case. Suboptimal power control policies are studied for the partial CSI case in order to reduce the high computational cost associated with large numbers of sensors or receive antennas. Numerical results show that significantly improved performance can be achieved by adding multiple receive antennas at the FC. In the case of multiple transmit antennas, the distortion outage at the FC can be dramatically reduced and in some cases completely eliminated, by transmitting the observations on the null space of the eavesdropper's channel or deploying an artificial noise technique, in the full CSI and partial CSI cases, respectively.
Abstract-In this paper, we investigate a class of distortion outage minimization problems for a wireless sensor network in the presence of an eavesdropper. The observation signals transmitted from the sensors to the fusion center (FC) are overheard by the eavesdropper. Both the FC and the eavesdropper reconstruct minimum mean squared error estimates of the physical quantity observed. We address the problem of transmit power allocation to minimize the distortion outage at the FC, subject to an expected total transmit power constraint across the sensor(s) and a secrecy outage constraint at the eavesdropper. Applying a rigorous probabilistic power allocation technique, we derive power policies for the full channel state information (CSI) case. Suboptimal power control policies are studied for the partial CSI case in order to reduce the high computational cost associated with large numbers of sensors or receive antennas. Numerical results show that significantly improved performance can be achieved by adding multiple receive antennas at the FC. In the case of multiple transmit antennas, the distortion outage at the FC can be dramatically reduced and in some cases completely eliminated, by transmitting the observations on the null space of the eavesdropper's channel or deploying an artificial noise technique, in the full CSI and partial CSI cases, respectively. Index Terms-Distributed estimation, outage probability, fading channels, secrecy outage, sensor networks, power allocation.
I. INTRODUCTION
W IRELESS Sensor Networks (WSNs) have attracted much recent research interest and have been widely studied due to many military as well as civilian applications such as environmental monitoring, traffic control, battlefield surveillance etc. A typical wireless sensor network normally consists of some small, inexpensive, and low-power sensors, which are deployed over a region and may communicate with a remote processor over wireless links [1] . In distributed estimation, sensors independently collect data about some phenomenon, which X. Guo is with the Department of Electrical and Electronic Engineering, The University of Melbourne, Parkville, VIC 3010, Australia (e-mail: xiaoxig@student.unimelb.edu.au).
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Digital Object Identifier 10.1109/ TSIPN.2016.2612122 are sent to a fusion centre (FC) and then combined to reconstruct a final estimate of the observed quantity. In a WSN, the sensors typically have limited energy resources and replacing batteries is considered expensive. Many works have studied how to efficiently transmit the observations from the sensors to the FC. In [2] , [3] , a digital approach was considered where the analog observations are digitised into bits and then modulated and transmitted. In [4] , [5] , the authors showed that using uncoded analog forwarding of observed signals is asymptotically optimal in estimating a Gaussian source for a coherent Gaussian multiple access channel (MAC); and exactly optimal in [6] under certain situations. Deploying this analog-forwarding transmission, the authors in [7] studied the optimal power scheduling problem in an inhomogeneous sensor network; while the power allocation policies for a vector source were investigated in [8] . The diversity order of decentralized estimation in terms of increasing numbers of sensors has also been explored in [9] , [10] .
In the context of communications and information theory, the idea of information outage probability minimization was introduced in [11] for block-fading channels, and has been further extended in e.g. [12] , [13] . A similar concept of estimation outage probability for distributed estimation was introduced by the authors in [9] , which is defined as the probability that the estimation distortion exceeds a certain threshold. With full channel state information, the authors in [14] considered a clustered WSN and derived the optimal power allocation for estimation outage minimization problem; the results were extended to partial channel state information (CSI) with limited feedback in [15] . In [16] , the authors explored the diversity order for distortion outage minimization over coherent multi-access channels. Optimal power allocation for estimation outage probability minimization was also studied in [17] for state estimation of linear dynamical systems.
Under open wireless media, when the measurements at individual sensors are confidential, maintaining secrecy in a wireless network becomes quite challenging. The traditional cryptographic encryption techniques suffer many vulnerabilities and can be difficult to implement in sensor networks under energy and computational constraints [18] , [19] . As an alternative, the concept of physical layer security has recently garnered a lot of research interest. The concept of wiretap channel was introduced by Wyner in [20] . It showed that a non-zero secrecy capacity can only be obtained if the adversary's channel 2373-776X © 2016 IEEE. Personal use is permitted, but republication/redistribution requires IEEE permission.
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is of lower quality than that of the legitimate recipient. From an information theoretic perspective, the authors in [21] - [23] studied the secrecy capacity in the case of full CSI or partial CSI, and investigated MIMO channels in [24] - [28] . Multiterminal source coding or CEO problems with secrecy constraints were also considered in [29] - [31] . In particular, in [31] , the authors investigated secure lossy source coding in the presence of an eavesdropper who is able to observe the coded information bits and has access to correlated side information. Under these assumptions, the authors derived inner and outer bounds on the achievable rate region. The authors in [32] considered a different scenario where the eavesdropper can obtain the size of the packets, thus parsing the bit stream into separate encrypted messages. Bounds on coding rate and key rate are derived for perfect zerodelay secrecy. However, although such secure source coding techniques enable one to gain information-theoretic insights, it does not provide a closed form expression for distortion achievable via multi-sensor estimation over fading channels. Thus motivated, we investigate the secure estimation problem from a signal processing viewpoint where sensors employ simple uncoded analog-forwarding techniques [33] to transmit their observations to the FC. In this way, a direct expression for the distortion over fading channels can be obtained, which is more desirable for deriving analytical results. In fact, various secrecy schemes from a 'signal processing' rather than information theoretic point of view have also been studied in [34] - [38] , where different performance metrics, such as biterror-rate, signal-interference-to-noise ratio, Ali-Silvey distances or error probability were used to measure secrecy in a system. Related techniques based on cooperating relays, artificial noise generation or beamforming were also implemented in [34] , [39] - [41] to secure a system. Moreover, the minimum mean-square error (MMSE) is closely related to the mutual information. In [42] , the authors discovered that regardless of the input distribution the derivative of the mutual information (in nats per channel use) w.r.t. SNR is equal to half the MMSE, as long as the input signals are observed through an additive Gaussian noise channel. In [30] , the authors related the equivocation rate to the normalized distortion at the eavesdropper in the CEO problem with additional secrecy constraints, where they showed that the estimation error at the eavesdropper is an upper bound of the equivocation rate. The authors in [43] showed that for a linear Gaussian system, the Kalman filter is the optimal filter for both the MMSE measure and several information theoretic measures. Therefore, in favour of a closed form distortion expression for multi-sensor estimation over fading channels, we consider analog uncoded transmission at the sensors. Recently, the authors in [44] looked at the optimal power allocation for a distributed estimation problem in the presence of an eavesdropper. To secure the system a minimum distortion threshold is set for the eavesdropper to ensure that the estimation error at the eavesdropper is no smaller than this threshold. However, due to the randomness of the fading channels, the quality of the estimate at the FC becomes a random variable. This might be detrimental to real-time applications when the distortion at the FC becomes large for a particular fading realisation, or the distortion at the eavesdropper becomes very small. Hence, for a delay constrained sensor network, instead of minimising a long-term average estimation error at the FC as in [44] , it is more appropriate to maintain a target distortion level throughout the fading process and minimise a distortion outage probability 1 at the FC and a secrecy outage constraint at the eavesdropper. This is the subject of our current work.
In this paper, we look at a WSN where each sensor independently measures a single point Gaussian source, and then transmits the noisy measurements to the FC using an uncoded analog scheme over an orthogonal multiple-access channel (MAC) in the presence of an eavesdropper or adversary. Both the FC and the adversary attempt to reconstruct a MMSE estimate of the observations. Under this setting, the main contributions of the paper are: 1) We consider power allocation problems that minimise the distortion outage probability at the FC, subject to an expected total transmit power constraint and a secrecy outage constraint at the eavesdropper, where an estimation secrecy outage is defined as the event that the mean squared error (MSE) at the eavesdropper is below a minimum acceptable distortion level. In this way, the entire network is guaranteed to operate under a specified power constraint; while maintaining a certain level of confidentiality. 2) We study the distortion outage probability at the FC that can be achieved by adding multiple receive antennas in both the full CSI and partial CSI cases. In addition, we propose suboptimal power allocation policies to alleviate the high computational cost issues raised by computing the locally optimal power policy in the partial CSI case. 3) As an alternative to having multiple sensors in a network, the scenario of a single sensor with multiple transmit antennas is investigated. Numerical studies illustrate that in both the full CSI and partial CSI cases, zero outage can be achieved at the FC with a sufficiently large power budget. The rest of the paper is organised as follows. In Section II we present the system model for a multiple-sensor network and solve the outage minimization problem. In Section III, we investigate the secrecy outage problem for the multiple-antenna single sensor scenario and study optimal power control policies for both full and partial CSI. In Section IV, alternative problems that can be solved by applying similar techniques are formulated. Illustrative numerical results are provided in Section V, followed by concluding remarks in Section VI.
II. MULTIPLE SENSORS SCENARIO
A schematic diagram of the wireless sensor network model is shown in Fig. 1 , where we have K sensors observing a single point Gaussian source with zero mean and variance σ [t] received by the kth sensor at time t is corrupted with noise and is given by We assume that both the FC's and the eavesdropper's channels experience block fading, where the channels remain constant during each coherence time interval, and are i.i.d. over different time intervals [45] . The signals received by the FC and eavesdropper from the kth sensor are then given by, respectively, 
Using the fact that each sensor transmits through an orthogonal MAC, the covariance of the noise fac-
can be derived as a KN r × KN r matrix: Eq. (4) as shown at the bottom of the page The linear minimum mean square error (MMSE) estimator is well known to be the optimal estimator for θ under the model (2) [46] . At time t the mean squared error (MSE) or distortion at the FC using the MMSE estimator is
. . .
where (a) results from applying the Matrix Inversion Lemma,
is the power allocated on the kth sensor, and
is the sum of channel power gains from the kth sensor to the FC with h m k [t] being the channel gain from sensor k to the mth antenna at the FC. Similarly, the distortion at the eavesdropper is given as:
where
is the sum of channel power gains from the kth sensor to the eavesdropper and h e nk [t] is the channel gain from sensor k to the nth antenna at the eavesdropper. Note that for a given set of
, ∀k would result in the same distortion, hence our primary focus is {p k [t]}. Due to the 3 The notation x T and x H refers to the transpose of x and conjugate transpose of x, respectively.
randomness of the fading channels, the instantaneous distortions at the FC and the eavesdropper, as shown in (5) and (6), change over time. Different from our previous work [44] in which we studied optimal power allocation for an expected distortion minimization with a security constraint at the eavesdropper, in this paper we focus on the distortion outage minimization problem. For a given maximum acceptable distortion level D at the FC, we define a distortion outage to be the event that the instantaneous distortion D . We assume that the full channel state information (CSI) of the sensor-to-FC channels are available at the FC, while eavesdropper's channel information may or may not be available at the FC. The FC designs the optimal power allocation strategy based on the available CSI, and then sends {p k [t]} back to the sensors via a secure feedback link.
In this paper, we wish to minimise the distortion outage probability at the FC by adapting the transmit powers of the sensors at each channel instance, while keeping the secrecy outage probability under a certain threshold, i.e., Pr outage EVE ≤ δ, and the average sum of sensor transmission powers, defined as
, to be less than a power budget P tot .
Due to the assumption of system independence over time t, we will drop the time index t for the rest of the paper.
A. Full CSI
In this section, we assume the FC can also acquire the channel information between the sensors and the eavesdropper. As a result, the power control policies can be derived such that sensors are able to adjust the transmission powers depending on both the FC's and the eavesdropper's channel information. Clearly, the requirement of full CSI of the eavesdropper channels is infeasible in practice. However, the optimal performance with this assumption is instructive as well as useful as a benchmark for the performance with partial CSI of the eavesdropper channels, to be analysed subsequently.
Let the channel states at the FC and the eavesdropper be denoted by g = [g 1 , . . . , g K ] and g e = [g e 1 , . . . , g e K ], respectively. The outage minimization problem is
where G = [g; g e ] and p(G)
is the total power consumption. P (G) is a vector of random variables with conditional probability density function f P|G (p| G), where p is one of the deterministic schemes and p = [p 1 , . . . , p K ] are the powers allocated across the sensors.
Notice that, from the expression of D e in (6), when zero power is allocated to the sensors, we obtain D e | p=0 = σ 2 θ , giving the largest possible distortion at the eavesdropper, while if the transmit power on each sensor approaches infinity, we have the smallest possible distortion at the eavesdrop-
Therefore, in order to produce a meaningful solution to problem (7), D e should satisfy (
θ , where κ is a nonnegative threshold to ensure constraint (7a) is achievable for a given transmit power budget P tot and a secrecy outage probability threshold δ.
In communications theory, it was shown in [13] , [45] that for information outage minimization problems the optimal power allocation policy is in general a probabilistic policy, in particular this is often the case for discrete channel distributions. Motivated by these results, we start with a probabilistic power allocation P (G).
Denote the indicator function by 1 {x}, where 1 {x} = 1 if x is true; otherwise 1 {x} = 0. With the perfect CSI at the FC, the distortion outage probability at the FC and the secrecy outage probability at the eavesdropper can be expressed as, respectively,
where F (G) denotes the cumulative distribution function (cdf) of G.
We outline the strategy involved in solving problem (7), which are similar to techniques used in [13] . We first show that for an arbitrary feasible probabilistic power allocation P (G), which can be divided into four non-overlapping power regions, we can always construct another feasible probabilistic power allocationP (G) that contains three power regions, with the powers in one of the regions all equal to zero, and such thatP (G) gives no worse performance than P (G). Next, based onP (G), we construct another feasible power scheme P (G) which is randomised among three deterministic power schemes {p i (G)} , i = 1, 2, 3 with corresponding weighting factors {ω i (G)}. Furthermore, we show that P (G) performs at least as well asP (G).
First, given a feasible probabilistic power scheme P (G) with the conditional probability density function f P|G (p| G), we partition the powers into four non-overlapping power regions as given in (10) .
The objective is to minimise the distortion outage probability at the FC with the secrecy outage probability at the eavesdropper being less than δ. As 
by a region where all the powers are set to 0, which saves transmit power and does not violate the constraints (7a) and (7b). We denote this new feasible probabilistic power scheme asP (G), which has three non-overlapping power regions for a given G, namely,
with all powers in B 3 (D, D e , G) equal to zero. Next, we construct fromP (G) another probabilistic power scheme P (G) which randomises among three deterministic power allocations {p i (G)} with time-sharing factors {ω i (G)}, i.e.,
where X (G) is defined as
1, with probability ω 1 (G) , 2, with probability ω 2 (G) , 3, with probability ω 3 (G) .
The deterministic power schemes {p i (G)} are defined by averaging the powers in each of the regions (11), i.e.,
The corresponding weighting functions {ω i (G)} are defined as the probability of using each deterministic power strategy 
Lemma 1: There exists an optimal solution to problem (7) of the form P (14) and (13), respectively, and
The proof is given in Appendix A. From Lemma 1, a solution to the problem stated in (7) can be obtained as a solution to the following optimization problem, shown as:
The functional optimization problem (16) is in general nonconvex. Let γ, λ, ν e (G), ν (G), and s (G) denote the nonnegative Lagrange multipliers for the constraints (16a)-(16e), respectively, then the Lagrangian of problem (16) is defined as:
The generalised Karush-Kuhn-Tucker (KKT) conditions [47] are:
are the optimal Lagrange multipliers, and p *
From (18), we know that for any nonnegative p * 1k (G) and p * 2k (G), they must satisfy, respectively,
and
Furthermore, from (17)- (22), we can obtain the Lagrangian at the optimal points for each channel state G as
from which we can obtain ∂l(. . .
Note that if the channel distributions of both the eavesdropper and the FC are continuous, then the events λ * p *
Thus, from condition (19) and (28)- (29), we obtain the following result:
Remark 2: From the structure of the power allocation in (12) and (30), we see that for continuous fading channel distributions, the optimal power allocation policies are deterministic.
Theorem 1: Consider the following optimization problems (31) and (32) :
with optimal solutions p * a (G) and p * b (G), respectively. Then a locally optimal solution to problem (16) is given by:
otherwise.
The proof is given in Appendix B.
Remark 3:
The dual problem of (32) has been investigated and solved in [9] , where the sensors with poor observation quality or small channel gains are turned off to conserve energy. Problem (31) is non-convex; therefore, we apply Lagrangian multiplier techniques to obtain a locally optimal solution, where the necessary KKT conditions are given in Appendix B. In addition, we may have no feasible solutions for problem (31) , which corresponds to the channel conditions where there are Define a non-negative transmit power difference
. We may then further categorise the power transmission policy into two different types, depending on the given secrecy outage probability threshold δ and power budget 
is small or the transmit power budget is large, instead of using p * b (G), which would result in outage at the eavesdropper, using p * a (G) guarantees non-outage at both the FC and the eavesdropper. If the incremental power p diff (G) is too large, the sensors will stop transmitting to save power.
B. Partial CSI
Due to the practical difficulties in obtaining the full channel information of the eavesdropper, in this subsection, we will assume that the FC only has statistical knowledge of the eavesdropper. We first explore the power allocation problem that minimises the long-term average distortion at the FC via the Lagrange multiplier technique. To reduce computational cost we then consider suboptimal power allocation policies.
From the analysis in Section II-A, we notice that the optimal transmit power policies are deterministic if both the FC's and eavesdropper's fading channels have continuous distributions, based on which, in this part of the work we aim to develop deterministic transmit power policies with full knowledge of only the sensor-to-FC channels g, which is different from II-A where the full CSI of both the sensor and eavesdropper, i.e., G = [g; g e ], are known. Using a similar setup as problem (7), the Lagrangian in the partial CSI case can be constructed as
where λ and ν are non-negative Lagrange multipliers satisfying the following equations at the optimal point:
To minimise the Lagrangian given in (34), we need to find the optimal power allocation for each channel state at the FC such that
Then a globally optimal p * (g) of problem (7) in partial CSI case must satisfy 0 ≤ 1{D(g, p * (g)) > D} + ξ(p * (g)) ≤ 1, where the optimal power allocation p * (g) has the form
withp (g) being a locally optimal solution of the following problem:
The proof is given in Appendix C.
1) Partial CSI Suboptimal Solution:
Due to the difficulties of explicitly expressing 1 {D e (g e , p (g)) < D e } f (g e ) dg e and deriving a locally optimal solution to problem (37) , which has high computational costs, in this part we will look at a suboptimal power allocation scheme based on sensor scheduling.
In a multiple-sensor system, instead of activating all the sensors, we can selectively choose one sensor to forward its measurement to the FC. This may be useful in scenarios where bandwidth is at a premium or there are very strict interference constraints. Let g m = max (g 1 , . . . , g K ), and g e m = max (g e 1 , . . . , g e K ) where m corresponds to the index of the sensor with the largest channel gain. One possible sensor scheduling policy is that only the sensor with the best channel transmits. The distortion at the FC and the eavesdropper then become: 
To explicitly illustrate the power policies in this scheme, we will assume that the channel power gains are exponentially distributed at both the FC and the eavesdropper with means 
from which we can then compute the optimal solution aŝ
Knowing that the eavesdropper's channel is exponentially distributed, we can derive the outage probability at the eavesdropper for a given FC channel state as
where D th = .
Combining the results of (36), (40) and (41), we obtain the transmit power policy:
where g m th satisfies ν * e
, and with λ * and ν * being the optimal Lagrange multipliers chosen to satisfy the power constraint and secrecy outage constraint at the eavesdropper. Notice that as g m is continuous and
is monotonic decreasing with g m , we obtain the 'on-off' transmit power policy in (42) , where if g m > g m th the sensor useŝ p (g m ) to transmit with non-outage at the FC achieved, and the sensor does not transmit when g m ≤ g m th which leads to an outage to occur at the FC. In addition, the overall outage probability at the FC can be expressed as From (41) and (42), which are two monotonic decreasing functions with respect to g m , we obtain that g m th (λ * , ν * ) must satisfy either
λ . This is because for a given total power budget and outage probability threshold at the eavesdropper, there is zero probability of finding a g m th to meet both constraints with equality. From the KKT conditions for the optimal points, we then derive that either
III. SINGLE SENSOR WITH MULTIPLE ANTENNAS SCENARIO
In order to compare with the multiple-sensor scenario as well as for analytical tractability, in this part of the work we consider a situation where only one sensor with multiple-antennas is in the network observing the source. In this scenario, similar performance gains as in having multiple sensors can be achieved. In fact, with multiple antennas additional techniques, such as the artificial noise and beamforming [34] , [39] , [41] , can be used to further enhance the system performance for both the full CSI and partial CSI cases. In this section, we investigate the multiple-antenna single sensor system.
A schematic diagram is shown in Fig. 2 . We assume that the same single point Gaussian source θ as defined in Section II is observed by a sensor with N t transmit antennas, which employs the analog amplify and forward technique to scale the observed signal with a complex vector β ∈ C N t ×1 , before sending it to the FC via a set of complex fading channels H ∈ C N r×N t . The observed signal x is also listened to by the eavesdropper after passing through another set of channels H e ∈ C N e×N t , where we assume that the FC and the eavesdropper are equipped with N r and N e receive antennas, respectively.
The signals received by the FC and the eavesdropper are, respectively, y = Hβθ + Hβω + z, (45a)
where z ∈ C N r×1 and z e ∈ C N e×1 are complex Gaussian channel noise at the FC and the eavesdropper, with covariances σ 2 I N r and σ 2 e I N e , respectively. The optimal linear minimum mean square error (MMSE) estimator, is used at both the FC and the adversary to measure θ. For a given channel instance, the distortion D at the FC can be obtained as
. We set a maximum acceptable distortion level D at the FC and define the distortion outage probability as
where With a given power budget at the sensor, our objective is to minimise the distortion outage probability at the FC, while keeping the secrecy outage probability at the eavesdropper below δ.
Hence the optimization problem can be cast as:
In the following, we focus on the full CSI scenario where both the FC and eavesdropper's channel information are available, and the partial CSI scenario where we assume only the FC's channel states are perfectly known. In both scenarios, we first focus on finding the best β that minimises the objective while satisfying all the constraints. We then consider other techniques that can be used in the multiple-antenna systems to further enhance the performance.
A. Full CSI
With full knowledge of the eavesdropper's channel information, problem (49) can be solved using similar techniques as in Section II-A, where we start from an arbitrary feasible probabilistic power allocation scheme, from which it can be used to construct another feasible power allocation scheme that provides no worse performance, and based on which we construct three deterministic schemes β 1 , β 2 , and β 3 = 0. We then show that the optimal β * , which is a function of H and H e , can be found by considering a probabilistic power allocation scheme that randomises among the three deterministic schemes β 1 , β 2 , and β 3 with corresponding weighting factors 
where the derivation is similar to that of problem (16) and is thus omitted to avoid repetition. As problem (59) is again a non-convex problem, the result we derive is a locally optimal solution. With the assumption that both H and H e are continuously distributed, the solution of problem (49) in the case of full CSI is given as 
Note that problem (52) and (53) can be solved via the Lagrangian multiplier techniques. However, as all the constraints and objective functions in problem (52) and (53) are real-valued over the complex field, we need to consider both the real and imaginary parts when applying the KKT conditions for the optimal points [48] , [49] . Furthermore, because problem (52) is a non-convex optimization problem, while (53) is a convex problem; we obtain a locally optimal solution β * 1 of the problem (52) and a globally optimal solution β * 2 of the problem (53).
1) Zero Outage Probability at the Eavesdropper:
If the sensor has more transmit antennas than the number of receive antennas at the eavesdropper, i.e., N t > N e , then it can transmit the observation signal x onto the null space of the eavesdropper's channel, thus leaking no useful information to the eavesdropper. To be more specific, let the singular value decomposition of H e be H e = USV H . Then we can express the eavesdropper's channel null space asṼṼ H , whereṼ contains the last N t − N e columns of V [50] . Define a precoding matrix W =ṼṼ H ∈ C N t . The signals received by the FC and the eavesdropper are then given by, respectively,
y e = H e Wβθ + H e Wβω + z e = z e .
On the eavesdropper side, as no information about x is received, we obtain the secrecy outage probability Pr outage EVE = 0.
The outage minimization problem can then be given as
Similar techniques as used in Section II-A can be employed to solve problem (56), and it can be shown that the globally optimal β * is constructed by randomizing among two deterministic power schemes β 1 and β 2 = 0 with corresponding weighting factors ω and 1 − ω. Furthermore, problem (56) can be reformulated into the following problem:
The solution is given as
where λ * is the optimal Lagrange multiplier associated with the power constraint (57a) which is obtained numerically, and β * 1 is the globally optimal solution of the problem:
Remark 4: With this scheme, the FC's effective channel is HW, which is the projection of H onto the null space of H e via the precoding matrix W. Moreover, a locally optimal solution of problem (59) can be obtained via the Lagrangian multiplier techniques. If the FC has only one receive antenna, i.e., N r = 1, we obtain the beamforming vector β *
H ||HW || (where the notation ||x|| refers to the Euclidean norm of the vector x), which lines up with the effective channel HW while satisfying the power constraint. 4 
B. Partial CSI
In this part of the work, we consider a case where the FC can acquire its channel information but only has statistical knowledge of the eavesdropper's. From the full CSI case, we know that a deterministic power allocation is optimal for continuously distributed fading channels. Therefore, applying the results derived in Section II-B, we can obtain a locally optimal β * at each FC channel instance as:
whereβ is a locally optimal solution to the problem:
with λ and ν (H) being nonnegative Lagrange multipliers corresponding to the power constraint and the secrecy outage constraint at the eavesdropper, respectively. Note that solving the sub-problem (60) requires high computational costs owing to the difficulties of explicitly expressing
dF (H e ), but a locally optimal solution can still be found using the Lagrangian multiplier techniques.
1) Artificial Noise:
Assuming that the sensor is equipped with more transmit antennas than the number of receive antennas at the FC, we can employ the technique of artificial noise [39] , [51] to enhance the system performance. The idea is to increase the noise level seen by the adversary in a way that its channel is degraded while the channel of the legitimate receiver is not. With this method, the artificial noise is generated by the sensor and transmitted onto the null space of the FC, thus it does not impact the message received by the FC but increases the noise level at the eavesdropper.
Let [W 1 , W 2 ] be an orthonormal basis of C N t with W 1 ∈ C N t ×N r and W 2 ∈ C N t ×(N t −N r ) representing the signal space and the null space of H, respectively. The signals received by the FC and the eavesdropper are, respectively,
where the artificial noise v ∈ C (N t −N r )×1 has N t − N r i.i.d. complex Gaussian elements with zero mean and variance p a .
It can be seen from (61) that the sensor transmits observation information W 1 βx plus a 'noise' term W 2 v, which is chosen to be a random vector in the null space of H, to reduce the possibility of small noise being seen by the eavesdropper. As [W 1 , W 2 ] is a unitary matrix, we obtain that H e W 1 is independent of H e W 2 , giving the effective noise at the eavesdropper as H e W 2 v + z e . The transmit power in each fading block is given as σ 
In order to solve problem (62), we can employ similar techniques as described in Section II-B, which are omitted for brevity. For the special case of a single receive antenna at both the FC and the eavesdropper, the problem is reduced to finding p and p a , where p β H β ∈ R. Letp a be the solution of
where λ and ν are the corresponding Lagrange multipliers for the average power constraint and secrecy outage constraint of problem (62) 
IV. ALTERNATIVE FORMULATIONS
In Sections II and III, we considered problems that minimise the distortion outage probability at the FC while maintaining the secrecy outage probability at the eavesdropper and overall power consumption to be below certain thresholds. Alternative problems can also be formulated. For instance, we can minimise the secrecy outage probability at the eavesdropper, with a distortion outage constraint at the FC and an expected total transmit power constraint among sensors, given as
where φ is the distortion outage probability threshold at the FC. Another potential problem would be to minimise the long-term expected estimation error at the FC subject to a secrecy outage constraint at the eavesdropper and an expected total power constraint among the sensors, written as
For both problems, we could consider the full CSI and the partial CSI cases, which can both be solved using similar techniques as in Section II. Note that problems (64), (65) are formulated for the multiple-sensor scenario. Similar problem formulations could also be constructed for a multiple-antenna scenario.
V. NUMERICAL RESULTS
We first consider a situation with three sensors. For simplicity, we consider the source σ 
where d ∈ {d k , d e k } is the distance between sensor k and the FC or the eavesdropper in meters, and f is the signal frequency in megahertz (we assume the network uses an operation frequency of 800 MHz). Then, the channel power gain follows an exponential distribution with mean 10 − P L 1 0 mW. In addition, the total power budget range is set to 1 mW ≤ P tot ≤ 11 mW, to ensure that the secrecy outage probability requirement at the eavesdropper is achievable. The maximum acceptable distortion level D at the FC is set to 0.007 while the required minimum distortion level D e at the eavesdropper is 0.01. Fig. 3 shows the distortion outage probability at the FC with two antennas at the eavesdropper, under different secrecy outage probability requirements at the eavesdropper, namely 0.1 and 0.2. When the number of receive antennas at the FC is fixed, it is seen that for both sets (i.e., N r = 2 and N r = 3) the outage probability at the FC behaves similarly for the two different outage requirements at the eavesdropper when P tot is small. As we increase the total power budget, they start to decrease until saturation. This is because when P tot is small, the sensors are more likely to choose small power consumption policies that only guarantee non-outage at the FC, or the sensors would simply stop transmitting to save power. As the transmission power budget increases, sensors begin to transmit in channel states where outage happens neither at the FC nor at the eavesdropper, until a point where more incremental power would lead to the secrecy outage probability at the eavesdropper being greater than the security requirement δ, at which the distortion outage probability at the FC saturates.
In Fig. 4 , we compare the distortion outage probability at the FC with the sensor scheduling scheme, partial CSI, and full CSI schemes in a three-sensor network, with the FC having two or three antennas. As we can see, similar to Fig. 3 , the outage probability at the FC is smaller when the FC is equipped with more antennas for all three cases. In addition, the performance of sensor scheduling follows closely the partial CSI case, and it even has similar performance as the full CSI case when the transmit power budget is small.
The distortion outage probability at the FC versus different transmit power budgets is plotted in Fig. 5 , where we compare the performance of sensor scheduling to the partial CSI case with the secrecy outage probability constraint at the eavesdropper set to 0.14, 0.18 and 0.22. The first thing to be noticed is the close performance of sensor-scheduling and partial CSI power allocation in all three scenarios (i.e., δ = 0.14, δ = 0.18 and δ = 0.22) when the power budget P tot is relatively small. In addition, the results stated in (43) and (44) can be easily verified from the behaviour of sensor-scheduling. When we have a small power budget, Pr outage FC performs the same for all scenarios regardless of the different secrecy outage requirements at the eavesdropper, which implies that the total power constraint satisfies equality at the optimal points, whereas the secrecy outage constraint is loose. As we keep increasing the power budget, Pr outage FC settles down to a point at which the secrecy outage constraint is satisfied with equality but the power constraint is loose, since any power increment makes no improvement.
Next, we study the distortion outage probability at the FC for the multiple-antenna single sensor scenario, where we assume that the sensor is 127 m away from the FC, and 130 m away from the eavesdropper. For simplicity, we assume that the sensor is equipped with three antennas, whereas there is only one antenna at the FC and one or two antennas at the eavesdropper. We consider the maximum acceptable distortion level D e at the eavesdropper being set to 0.013, which is twice as large as the required minimum distortion level D at the FC. We assume the same noise level for both the FC and the eavesdropper, where σ 2 = σ 2 e = 10 −8 mW. In Fig. 6 , the distortion outage probability at the FC versus the average power budget is plotted for full CSI, full CSI with Pr outage EVE = 0, partial CSI and partial CSI-Artificial Noise schemes. As we can see, the full CSI case outperforms the partial CSI case, and in both cases the distortion outage probability at the FC saturates. By contrast, the full CSI with Pr outage EVE = 0 and partial CSI-Artificial Noise schemes perform better when we have a relatively large transmit power budget, where Pr outage FC keeps decreasing as P tot increases. More interestingly, it is seen from that the full CSI Pr outage EVE = 0 scheme performs no better than the partial CSI-Artificial Noise scheme across the entire power range. This is owing to the fact that the effective channel gains of the FC are largely reduced when projecting it onto the eavesdropper's channel null space, whereas in the case of partial CSI-Artificial Noise, only a small portion of the transmit power is used to generate 'noise'.
To closely observe the performance of Pr outage FC using artificial noise, in Fig. 7 , we look at scenarios where the eavesdropper has more receive antennas than the FC, and we also plot the full CSI and partial CSI cases for comparison. It is noticeable that when the eavesdropper has more antennas, Pr outage FC in the partial CSI case quickly saturates which is then followed by the full CSI case, as at certain channel states the sensor has to stop transmitting in order to maintain the required secrecy outage probability at the eavesdropper. Whereas in the case of partial CSI-Artificial Noise, because the sensor can intentionally generate noise to degrade the eavesdropper's channel, it can explore more channel states to transmit the observation signals to the FC. Similar behaviour is seen when the eavesdropper has the same number of antennas as the FC, where the partial CSI-Artificial Noise gives better performance, as less 'noise' needs to be produced which means more power can be used to forward the observations. Therefore, the simulation results in Figs. 6 and 7 provide evidence that injecting artificial noise into the eavesdropper's channel appears to be a better solution for the single sensor multiple-antenna scenario.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have considered the problem of transmit power allocation for distortion outage probability minimization in the presence of an eavesdropper. We studied the distortion outage probability performance for both full CSI and partial CSI under two different scenarios: multiple sensor single antenna scenario and multiple antenna single sensor scenario. We proposed a suboptimal solution (for the partial CSI case) to overcome the high computational cost in the multiple-sensor scenario. With multiple transmit antennas at the sensor, we investigated techniques that can achieve zero outage at the eavesdropper. Simulation results showed that better performance can be achieved with additional receive antennas at the FC for the multiple-sensor scenario, and in the multiple antenna single sensor scenario the distortion outage probability at the FC can be reduced to zero if the transmit power budget is sufficiently large.
APPENDIX

A. Proof of Lemma 1
We will show that the power allocation policy given in (12) is feasible, i.e. P (G) satisfies the secrecy outage constraint at the eavesdropper (7a) and the total transmit power constraint (7b); and that P (G) performs at least as well asP (G).
SinceP (G) is feasible,P (G) must satisfy all the constraints, i.e.,
Remark 5: AsP (G) has three non-overlapping regions as defined in (11) , with all powers in B 3 (D, D e , G) being zero, we know that the only power region leading to outage at the eavesdropper is B 2 (D, D e , G) . In addition, the probability of choosing a power in B 2 (D, D e , G) is given as Pr [p (G) ∈ B 2 (D, D e , G)| G] , which is the same as the timesharing factor ω 2 (G) defined in (15) .
As the new probabilistic power allocation P (G) is randomised among the three deterministic power policies given in (14) , we can easily find the expected total power consumption of P (G) as
and hence P (G) satisfies the power constraint (7b). In addition, as both D (G, p (G)) and D e (G, p (G)) are continuous and convex over p (G), by the Mean Value Theorem (MVT) for integration, we know that, for a given channel realisation G, there exists ap 1 (G) ∈ B 1 (D, D e , G) such thatp 1 (G) = E[P(G)|p(G) ∈ B 1 (D, D e , G) , G]. Together with the definition of p 1 (G) in (14), we know that D (G, p 1 (G)) ≤ D and D e (G, p 1 (G)) ≥ D e . Similarly, only when P (G) = p 2 (G) does outage occur at the eavesdropper. Therefore, we can compute the secrecy outage probability at the eavesdropper when using the probabilistic power policy P (G) as 
Remark 6: Note that for the channel states where B 1 (D, D e , G) = ∅, the result given in (69) can be also established, since for those channel states we have ω 1 (G) = 0. By following the above arguments and applying the MVT, we see that outage occurs at the eavesdropper only when P (G) = p 2 (G).
The feasibility of P (G) has thus been proved. In order to see that the probabilistic power policy P (G) performs no worse thanP (G), we first show that for each channel realisation, the distortion outage probability at the FC when using P (G) is at least as small as when usingP (G). We then conclude that for a fixed maximum acceptable distortion level D at the FC, P (G) would result in the same or smaller outage probability at the FC. Given the channel realisation G, the distortion outage probability at the FC is given by:
where (a) follows from the definition of {ω i (G)} given in (15) and (b) follows from Jensen's inequality, since D (G, p (G)) is a convex function over p (G), and the last equality follows from (12) . Therefore, the resulting distortion outage probability at the FC from using P (G) is no worse than usingP (G), i.e.,
Combining (68), (69) and (71), we conclude that a probabilistic power allocation scheme P (G) with the form (12) is feasible and gives the same or smaller outage probability at the FC compared to an arbitrary probabilistic power allocation. Furthermore, from the definition of {p i (G)} given in (14), we have the following:
where (c) and (d) are obtained by applying conditional expectations.
B. Proof of Theorem 1
We will consider the case ω * j (G)=1, as when ω * j (G) = 0, the solution of p * j (G) has no impact on the optimization problem. which shares the same form as p * 1 (G), whereν * (G) is the optimal Lagrange multiplier corresponding to the distortion constraint at the FC for problem (31) . Therefore, if ω
